Yes! it is activated on the POA Core and the Sokol Testnet. The RandomAura contract provides on-chain random numbers.
POA Core Contract: 0x67e90a54AeEA85f21949c645082FE95d77BC1E70
Sokol Contract: 0x8f2b78169B0970F11a762e56659Db52B59CBCf1B
Currently, randomness is created through a RANDAO-like process, where validators commit the hash of a random number to the chain, then reveal that number later on. The revealed number is XORd with a previous random seed, creating a new random seed. For more details, see https://forum.poa.network/t/reliable-randomness-bringing-on-chain-entropy-to-the-xdai-stable-chain/3015
In the future, we will have secure, per-block randomness when HoneyBadger BFT is introduced.
No! Random values are only created during the reveals phase, which occurs every 20 blocks and continues for a period of 20 blocks (note this value is configurable).
A complete collection phase on both POA Core & Sokol is currently set to 40 blocks. The first half (the first 20 blocks) is called the commit phase, where random number hashes are committed by validators. The second half (the second 20 blocks) is the reveal phase, where numbers are revealed and added to the
Entropy increases throughout the reveal phase, and the final number revealed is the most secure. Applications requiring secure randomness should retrieve the
currentSeed from the final block of a reveal phase or during a commit phase.
The value is contained in the
currentSeed getter. It is important to check the phase (
reveal) and determine when the value is created. Details are available on the Accessing a Random Seed with a Smart Contract page.
Business logic actions that require randomness should not be allowed during the reveal phase. In addition, randomness can never be guaranteed for block
N + 1, only for some block between
N + commitRoundLength and
N + 2*commitRoundLength.
It is possible to create an on-chain PRNG where the
currentSeed value is used to seed a generator. However, as soon as the seed is known, the whole sequence is known! To add additional entropy, the seed may be salted with the block hash, however this method is still not considered secure.
A simple way to turn a single seed into multiple numbers is to use
hash(currentseed+2), etc., or something similar (e.g.
hash(currentseed+previousHash)). Limitations of this method (regarding security and speed) are discussed here: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/14467805/can-a-cryptographic-hash-algorithm-be-used-as-a-prng
While secure, there are considerations to keep in mind. They have to do with malicious validators who may choose to manipulate the outcome by not revealing their number. Validators cannot change the number they have committed, but they can choose to not commit or not reveal a number.
This means that during the reveal phase, a validator can effectively choose between 2 numbers, either the current number or the new one that will be created when they reveal their number. If an application uses the final number of the reveals phase, only the final validator can make this choice, limiting the scope of this issue.
To discourage skipping, validators who skip too often (or skip at the end of an epoch) will be reported as malicious. In POSDAO (a proof-of-stake algorithm that may be implemented in the future), malicious validators will be banned from the protocol for 90 days and their STAKE frozen. For now, we will monitor the network for any malicious behavior and validators can determine and vote on consequences.
Since validators on Sokol and POA are known individuals staking their reputation, this is not as much a concern as it would be in a permissionless network.
YES! When we move to HoneyBadger BFT, reliable random numbers will be produced per block via threshold signatures.
Using this approach, validators will signal their approval of a block by providing a portion of a signature (a signature share) rather than the entire signature. Once a predetermined number of shares are received by the algorithm (the threshold), they are combined to create a single signature which cannot be known beforehand. Because this number is secret until it is revealed, it can be used as a random number. A special property of this algorithm is that any combination of validators can collaborate to create the same final signature.
For more on HoneyBadger BFT, see https://www.xdaichain.com/for-validators/consensus/honeybadger-bft-consensus